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Abstract: This article repudiates the dichotomy that African ethics is communitarian 
(relational) and Western ethics is individualistic. „Communitarianism‟ is the view that 
morality is ultimately grounded on some relational properties like love or friendship; 
and, „individualism‟ is the view that morality is ultimately a function of some 
individual property like a soul or welfare. Generally, this article departs from the 
intuition that all morality including African ethics, philosophically interpreted, is best 
understood in terms of individualism. But, in this article, I limit myself to the 
literature in the African moral tradition; and, I argue that it is best construed in 
terms of individualism contrary to the popular stance of communitarianism. I  
defend my view by invoking two sorts of evidences. (1) I invoke prima facie evidence, 
which shows how both secular and religious moral thinkers in the tradition tend to 
understand it in individualistic terms. And, (2) I invoke concrete evidence, I show 
that the two terms that can be said to be definitive features of African ethical 
framework, namely: personhood and dignity, are individualistic. I conclude by  
considering possible objections against my defense of individualism as a central 
feature of African ethics.  






One of the perennial debates in African philosophy pertains to the rela-
tionship between the community and an individual. This debate can be 
framed in different ways. One can frame it in hierarchical terms where 
they consider the question of which between the two takes priority, the 
community or individual. In the literature, this debate plays itself out 
between the so called „radical‟ and „moderate‟ communitarians (Menkiti, 
1984; Gyekye, 1992; 1997). Whereas Ifeanyi Menkiti appears to be plac-
ing priority on the community; Gyekye places it on neither, he considers 
them to be equally fundamental. But commentators in the literature 
converge on the idea that Gyekye‟s moderate communitarianism also 
ends up prioritizing the community over the individual (Matolino, 2009; 
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Famanikwa, 2010). If this reading of Gyekye is correct then it reveals the 
stubbornness of the priority of the community in African thought1.  
This question can also be framed in terms of where to ultimately 
locate moral value: (1) in some individual property (individualism) or 
(2) some communal one (communitarianism)? Much of the literature 
seems to think that African moral thought is best construed in terms of 
locating it in some communal property rather than an individual one i.e., 
communal properties, in moral theorization, ought to take priority over 
individual ones (Ramose, 1999; Murove, 2004; Metz, 2007). This 
prioritization of the communal moral properties over individual ones is 
unsurprising given that African moral cultures are usually represented in 
the literature in terms of communitarianism as opposed to Western one‟s 
that are typically designated in terms of individualism (Shutte, 2001; 
Bujo, 2001; Mbigi, 2005). Gyekye (1992: 102) captures the importance of 
communal features by noting that they are not “only its outstanding 
features, but its defining characteristics”.  
In this article, I seek to argue that African moral cultures are more 
individualistic than we have been made to believe by scholars in the 
tradition. This is largely a moral project since I will be considering the 
question of where ultimately to locate moral value by analyzing what 
intellectuals in an African tradition have had to say2. And, I will show 
that consistently African scholars have located it in individual properties. 
Further, I will show that even those who overtly attempt to argue for 
non-individualistic approaches ultimately revert back to them, somehow. 
The novel claim defended in this article is that individualism is an 
inevitable and inescapable in moral philosophy, be it Western or African; 
but, in this article, I will limit my focus to the literature in the African 
moral tradition3.  
Other scholars have noted that there are strands of individualism in 
African moral thought. For example, Kevin Behrens (2011), writing in a 
context of defending an African environmental ethics, notices some 
strands of individualism in African moral thought; but he ultimately  
favors a communalistic account of it. Thad Metz (2007) in his influential 
article ”Toward an African Moral Theory” had indicated that in his 
survey of the literature in African moral thought, he had discovered that 
much of it takes an individualist orientation, but he goes on to defend a 
community-based moral theory as the most plausible way to understand 
African ethics (Metz, 2007; 2010).  
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Though these scholars rightly pick up some traces of individualism in 
an African tradition, they ultimately berate them as implausible attempts 
to capture African moral thought. This article differs from these 
attempts by insisting on individualism as a crucial or defining feature of 
African ethics. The reason why I take such a stance is that I believe that 
all morality ultimately is about individuals and their own lives in a social 
context. The social context occasions morality insofar as certain forms of 
social life are conducive for human (individual) life (right/good) and 
others are not (wrong/bad). So, morality is a servant of individuals rather 
than individuals being servants of it. 
To defend the essential individualism that characterizes African moral 
thought, I appeal to two central ethical terms in African moral thought, 
namely: personhood and dignity. Personhood is understood to be 
definitive of African moral thought (Masolo, 2010). In fact Gyekye 
notes:  
 
”With all this said, however, this aspect of this account adumbrates a moral 
conception of personhood and is, on that score, interesting and relevant to the 
notion of personhood important for the communitarian framework.” (Gyekye, 
1997: 64) 
 
So, here we are informed that the notion of personhood is important to 
a communitarian framework. In fact, Wiredu explicitly informs us that to 
understand values that embody communitarianism we have to study this 
notion of personhood (2008: 336). Another crucial notion in African 
thought is that of dignity. „Dignity‟ refers to beings that have inherent 
moral worth that are deserving of our utmost moral respect (Gyekye, 
1992; Ilesanmi, 2001). These two notions are thought to be essential 
components of the Afro-communitarian architecture so much that 
without them it will crumble or will be deformed beyond recognition. 
My argument is that taking these moral terms seriously commits us to 
locate the ultimate value in some individual property rather than a 
communal one. This conclusion may strike some as bizarre, but it is not 
absurd to think that communitarianism is an individualistic morality like 
all morality is.  
To defend individualism in Afro-communitarian morality, I structure 
this article as follows. Firstly, I distinguish between individualism and 
communitarianism. The success of this article, will in part, depend on the 
correct use of these two terms. Secondly, I provide prima facie evidence 
that points to individualism in African moral thought by considering 
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works of influential moral thinkers like Kwasi Wiredu and Kwame 
Gyekye, among others. This prima facie evidence strongly points to the 
prominence of individualism. I proceed next to demonstrate that 
commitment to the ideas of „personhood‟ and dignity renders Afro-com-
munitarianism to be founded on moral individualism. Finally, I conclude 
by considering objections against my defense of individualism, drawn 
mainly from Thad Metz‟s influential African relational moral theory.  
 
INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMUNITARIANISM 
 
In this section, I clarify how the ideas of individualism and com-
munitarianism are used in this article. „Individualism‟ refers to those  
moral theories that ultimately ground morality on some properties 
intrinsic to an individual like welfare, soul, rights (Behrens, 2011). For 
example, influential moral theories in the West like Utilitarianism and 
Kant‟s deontology usually takes an individualist frame in the sense 
defined here. Utilitarianism, for example, considers welfare construed as 
pleasure or informed preference on these intrinsic features of an 
individual (Singer, 1989: 150). Or, even Kant‟s deontology explains  
right/wrong actions in terms of whether they honor or undermine the 
individual‟s autonomy, a feature that is internal to an individual. So, 
wrong actions have an essential feature of harming or undermining some 
property of an individual4. 
The idea of „communitarianism‟ can occasion confusion in an African 
moral tradition. It can be understood either as a cultural claim or even as 
a metaphysical claim. I think Wiredu has this sense of a culture when he 
avers that: 
 
”To adjust the interests of the individual to those of the community is not to 
subordinate the one to the other. The relationship is a purely symmetrical. We could 
just as well have described it as the adjustment of the interests of the community to 
those of the individual. Moreover, we must not hypostatize the notion of the 
community. The community is simply a certain contextualization of individuals with 
respect to their locations and to their perceptions of their interests and of those of 
others. Communitarianism and individualism are both just different ways of ar-
ranging the pursuit of the interests of individuals.” (Wiredu, 2008: 334)   
 
The point of this long passage is simply to observe that different cultures 
organize themselves differently in pursuing human interests. Some cul-
tures put emphasis on the individual and others put it on the community. 
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At this level, it would be hasty or even misguided to seek to judge one 
cultural system as better than the other. At this level of differentiating 
cultures, we are engaged in a metaphysical or descriptive analysis, where 
we are merely distinguishing different forms of organizing to pursue 
individual interests. This distinction is appositely captured in the debate 
between liberals and communitarians in the Western tradition. To say 
liberalism is „individualistic‟ is to make a metaphysical claim about how 
they understand the relationship between an individual and society, 
where the individual is understood in terms of an analogy of an atom 
entailing that she is understood to be existing prior and independent of 
the community. And, „communitarianism‟ insists that an individual can-
not be understood outside of the communal relationships that (partially) 
constitute her. The debate at this level is not normative; it is simply 
metaphysical about the nature of an individual and her relation with the 
community, whether it is essential or contingent (Neale & Patrick, 1990).  
In this article, I am interested in more than these metaphysical claims 
about socialization and personal identity. By „communitarianism‟ I have 
in mind the view that morality ought to be accounted for purely in terms 
of some relationship rather than some feature of an individual. The fol-
lowing quotations capture this kind of understanding of morality. For 
example, Muxe Nkondo (2007: 90) avers that “the supreme value of so-
ciety, the primary importance of social or communal interests, obliga-
tions and duties over and above the rights of the individual”. Or,  
Desmond Tutu‟s claim that “Harmony, friendliness, community are great 
goods. Social harmony is for us the summum bonum – the greatest good” 
(Tutu, 1999: 35, emphasis mine). Or, Ifeanyi Menkiti‟s assertion that 
“…In the African understanding, priority is given to the duties which individu-
als owe to the collectivity, and their rights, whatever these may be, are seen as 
secondary to their exercise of their duties” (Menkiti, 1984: 181, emphasis 
mine).  
These thinkers converge on the idea that morality somehow is not 
something we owe directly to individuals because of some feature they 
possess. Instead, they appear to be grounding morality on some social 
relationship. Metz‟s understanding of African moral thought has come  
to be one of the leading defenders of this kind of normative com-
munitarianism, where some relationship(s) is made the basic carrier of 
value. Note how Metz (2007: 333) represents this position. Metz begins 
by drawing the distinction about where to ultimately locate value: “one 
might morally value something about people as they are in themselves or 
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as being part of certain relationships”. The word „or‟ is to point to the 
dichotomy that Metz has in mind: a moral theory is either based on 
individualistic considerations as fundamental or it is based on some 
relationship as primary. One either has a monistic individualistic or com-
munitarian moral theory. Metz is unequivocal that he defends a strictly 
relational theory: 
 
”A different understanding of the morality of ubuntu includes the idea that moral 
value fundamentally lies not in the individual, but rather in a relationship between 
individuals.” (Metz, 2007: 333)  
 
In the same page, he comments: 
 
”The idea that interpersonal relationships of some kinds have basic moral status is 
not often found in Anglo-American or Continental normative theory.  
So from the above, we can reasonably draw a distinction between individualistic and 
communitarian (relational) accounts. The distinction should be understood in terms 
of where to ultimately locate moral value: (1) some individual property or some 
interpersonal relationship(s).” (Metz, 2007: 333)  
 
An example might be useful to illustrate this distinction. Imagine a case 
of a drowning child. One can have two sorts of reasons to explain her 
decisions to save her. On an individualistic account, one would be saving 
her for reasons pertaining to the fact that she has a soul, welfare or 
dignity. The individualistic explanation invokes some property internal to 
her to ground why she is saved. A communitarianism account will invoke 
considerations external to the individual to explain why she is saved like 
she is my brother or any other type of a relationship. In the next section, 
I roughly consider the works of influential scholars of African moral 
philosophy to indicate that they ultimately defend moral individualism.  
 
INDIVIDUALISM IN AFRICAN MORAL THOUGHT 
 
There is no question that Kwasi Wiredu and Kwame Gyekye are one of 
the most influential moral thinkers in African philosophy. Interestingly 
both of them defend humanism (Molefe, 2015). „Humanism‟ is a meta-
ethical thesis about the nature of moral properties, that they are best 
understood in natural terms, specifically, some human property (Wiredu, 
1992; Gyekye, 1995). To support humanism, Wiredu (1992: 194) invokes 
this Akan maxim: “onipa na ohia” and he interprets it to mean “all human 
value derives from human interests”. In another place he notes that “the 
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first axiom of all Akan axiological thinking is that man or woman is the 
measure of all value” (1996: 65). It is abundantly clear that Wiredu‟s 
moral theory is individualistic. To defend humanism as a meta-ethical 
theory and to posit human interests or well-being as the basic moral 
norm settles the question that Wiredu‟s moral theory is thoroughly  
individualistic.  
The same can be said about Gyekye‟s moral theory. He is also a 
humanist and this implies that he has to ground morality on some 
human property since he rules out God, in some sense, from morality 
(Gyekye, 2010). Gyekye unequivocally states that “all other values are 
reducible ultimately to the value of well-being ... all things are valuable 
insofar as they enhance ... well-being ... as a „master value‟” (Gyekye, 
2004: 41). So, Gyekye like Wiredu grounds his moral theory on an indi-
vidualistic property of well-being; he calls this value the master value. All 
other values matter only secondarily, and well-being is foundational. So, 
here, we see two influential moral thinkers who defend a humanistic 
meta-ethics that locates morality in some human property. So, Akan 
morality as represented by these two influential African philosophers is 
individualistic as it grounds morality in some human property, specifi-
cally, well-being.  
One might hastily suppose that individualism will obviously only 
saliently be a feature of humanistic meta-ethics, but the case will be 
different for African moral scholars who defend a religiously founded 
morality. In fact, even influential theologians and philosophers who take 
a religious orientation to African ethics equally appear to endorse 
individualism. For example, take influential theologians in an African 
tradition like Laurenti Magesa, Benezet Bujo, Augustine Shutte and 
Godfrey Onah, among others; all these ground morality on some 
intrinsic property of life or vitality. For example, Magesa states that the 
aim of ethics is to “enhance the life force of the human person and the 
society” or “the sole purpose of existence … is to seek life” (Magesa, 
1997: 81 & 52). Or, Bujo states: “The main goal of African ethics is life 
itself … The life which issues from God becomes a task for all human 
beings …” (2001: 88; see also 1998: 27). In the same book he states that 
“life is the highest principle of ethics” (Bujo, 2001: 2-3). One will do well 
to remember that this talk of vitalism is reminiscent of Placide Tempels 
analysis of African metaphysics, which is grounded on the property of 
vitality. Tempels (1959: 30, 32) states of Bantu people‟s “… purpose is to 
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acquire life, strength or vital force … Each being has been endowed by 
God with a certain force, capable of strengthening the vital energy of the 
strongest being of all creation: man…”.  
So, these are religious moral theories since the reference to „life‟ or 
„vitality‟ is a reference to a divine property (Shutte, 2001). It is how 
individuals relate to this individualistic property of life that becomes the 
primary focus of morality. For example, Gyekye‟s normative theory takes 
a consequentialist frame insofar as it requires us to promote individual well-
being but these three religious thinkers may be construed to be 
defending a self-realization approach to ethics, which requires agents‟ to 
grow or preserve their vitality by way of perfecting their characters or so 
I understand them (Bujo, 2001: 88; Shutte, 2001: 14).  
From the above consideration, we see that among both the secular 
and religious approaches to ethics a tendency to take individualism as a 
hallmark of moral theorization in an African tradition. It is for this 
reason that the following remarks by Metz are not surprising: 
 
”It is a banality to say that dominant Western moral views are « individualistic » and 
African ones are « communitarian », and so it is odd that the most common 
theoretical interpretations of ubuntu, which I have explored above, are all more the 
former than the latter.” (Metz, 2007: 333) 
 
As I have demonstrated above, much of African moral accounts we just 
considered take individualism as a frame within which to articulate mo-
rality. The „odd‟ state Metz notices is as a result of colleagues being less 
than careful and thorough when they do their moral theorization and 
this has tended to represent communitarianism in less than perspicuous 
terms and this has also added to making it less plausible than it could be 
(Masolo, 2004). If this prima facie evidence is anything to go by then it 
raises a crucial question about why then call these theories „communita-
rian‟ if they are essentially individualistic. The purpose of this article is 
not to answer this relevant and pressing question, but to reveal the indi-
vidualism that characterizes African moral thought. But, a comment or 
two would dispel much confusion in the literature. 
I suppose these theories are rightly termed „communitarian‟ insofar as 
they posit some relationship(s) as the only effective means for achieving 
the good that belongs to the individual qua individual be it well-being or 
life. This point is well captured by Godfrey Onah when he states: 
 
”At the centre of traditional African morality is human life. Africans have a sacred 
reverence for life... To protect and nurture their lives, all human beings are inserted 
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within a given community... The promotion of life is therefore the determinant 
principle of African traditional morality and this promotion is guaranteed only in the 
community. Living harmoniously within a community is therefore a moral obliga-
tion ordained by God for the promotion of life.” (Cited in Metz, 2007: 329).  
 
Here, taking life as the basic moral good (individualism), Onah proceeds 
to inform us that to secure, promote or nurture it, the human com-
munity is decisive. The goal of ethics is to promote life but that goal can 
only be guaranteed by the community. Hence, relationships in this 
ethical approach are thought to be the only best means to achieve the 
moral goals entailed by individualism. Put more succinctly, individualism 
tell us that some property is the basis for understanding the chief moral 
goal of morality be it life or welfare; and, then communitarianism refers 
to the instrumental good i.e. the means necessary for achieving such a 
goal. Life is intrinsically good and the community is instrumentally good for 
securing the goal of morality. It is this insistence on the community as 
the only vehicle to achieve the moral goal of securing some individual 
good that makes African thought communitarianism or at least I  
recommend that is how we should understand it.  
For example, Utilitarianism will differ from this kind of communita-
rianism because someone in some remote room pressing a button that 
produces the greatest good for the greater number would be considered 
to be acting morally, but not so in an African tradition. One can only 
realize the moral good by some kind of interaction or relationship with 
others as the necessary feature of promoting individual morality. It is this 
element of relationships as instrumentally good that is decisive in ac-
counting for the communitarian status of African ethics. In the next sec-
tion, I proceed to provide what I consider to be more concrete evidence 
that African moral thought is best construed in terms of individualism, 
by considering two ethical concepts that are central to moral theorization 
in this tradition: personhood and dignity. 
 
PERSONHOOD AND INDIVIDUALISM 
 
I begin my analysis by considering the notion of personhood in 
an African tradition. This notion may be used either ontologically or nor-
matively (Ikuenobe, 2006; Molefe, 2016). Ontological accounts of 
personhood elucidate a theory of human nature i.e., they explain the 
features that constitute human nature be it the body, mind and/or soul 
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and so on. African scholars inform us however that normative 
considerations are “germane” or “more dominant” in this tradition 
(Ikuenobe, 2006: 117; Wiredu, 2009: 13). Behrens informs us that “there 
is an African conception of personhood that is not only distinct from 
Western notions, but is also foundational and characteristic of African philo-
sophical thought” (2013: 105). This notion we are told that it is distinct 
from what one usually finds in the West. We are also informed that it is 
both foundational and characteristic of African philosophical thought. It 
is therefore unsurprising that Metz‟s survey of the literature in African 
ethics indicates that “This is probably the dominant interpretation of 
African ethics” (2007: 331). It is equally important to note that African 
scholars tell us time and again that the best way to make sense of com-
munitarianism is through this very notion of personhood (Gyekye, 1992: 
102; Gyekye, 1997: 49; Mbigi, 2005: 75; Wiredu 2008: 336).  
Furthermore, influential scholars of African ethics converge on the 
idea that personhood entails a self-realization ethical theory (Van Niekerk, 
2007; 2013; Lutz, 2009; Molefe, 2017a). For example, Shutte states:  
 
”The moral life is seen as a process of personal growth... Our deepest moral 
obligation is to become more fully human. And this means entering more and more 
deeply into community with others. So although the goal is personal fulfilment, 
selfishness is excluded.” (Shutte, 2001: 30)   
 
The goal of morality is for an agent to be fully human, which is unders-
tood in terms personal growth. So, a self-realization approach to morality 
posits perfection of an agent as the proper goal of morality (Van 
Niekerk, 2007). Or, put in the parlance of personhood, one is expected 
to go beyond merely being an animal by developing moral characters 
imbued with moral virtue (Gyekye, 2010). Or, in the famous words of 
Menkiti “For personhood is something which has to be achieved, and is 
not given simply because one is born of human seed” or “As far as 
African societies are concerned, personhood is something at which indi-
viduals could fail, at which they could be competent or ineffective, better 
or worse… [so the goal is to convert] what was initially biologically 
given… to attain social self-hood, i.e., become a person with all the 
inbuilt excellencies implied by the term” (1984: 172-173). So, the term 
„person‟ is used ethically to refer to a human being that is characterized 
by moral excellence or moral virtue (Wiredu, 2009; Behrens, 2013). 
This idea of personhood thus represents a moral identity or even 
status a moral agent achieves as her character manifests virtues befitting 
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a genuine human life. If personhood refers to what the agent achieves 
then this ethical term is patently individualistic; the goal is perfecting 
something in the individual, her own humanity or some facet of it (Metz, 
2007: 330-331). And, this individualistic feature of this moral term oc-
curs to African thinkers but they do not emphasize it largely because 
they are absorbed by a misunderstanding of the project communita-
rianism (Gyekye, 1997; Masolo, 2004).  
Even in this approximation, scholars do not notice the individualist 
nature of this ethical term of personhood. Elsewhere, I have argued at 
length that if this ethical term posits self-realization as the proper goal of 
morality then it is a partialist in its orientation (Molefe, 2017b; see also 
Van Niekerk, 2007: 364). Put differently, one is expected to perfect her 
own humanity in a way that she is not expected to do for another. The 
goal of morality is not to the community itself for its own sake, as an 
end; no, the goal of morality is the individual herself, as an end. Her 
entering more and more into the community, as Shutte opined above, is 
merely as a means to achieve the goal of a self, which is perfection. It is 
for this reason that Jason van Niekerk thinks this ethical term renders 
African ethics to be “autocenntric” insofar as it is about the self (auto) 
centring all efforts to perfect itself by engaging with others positively in 
relationships (2007; 2013). One can better appreciate the partiality that 
characterizes this ethical term of personhood qua self-realization moral 
theory by thinking about it in terms of reasons for acting.  
One‟s reasons for acting can either be agent-neutral or agent-centred 
(MacNaughton, 2006). „Agent-neutral‟ reasons are those that make no 
reference at all to the agent or her special relationship in its quest to 
secure the good. The moral agent acts from an impartial standpoint. Act-
utilitarianism is agent-neutral in this sense: a moral agent is expected to 
promote the general good of anyone or even everyone since the interests 
of all count equally one cannot prioritize herself or special relationships 
(Rachels & Rachels, 2015). „Agent-centred‟ reasons are those that make 
an essential reference to the agent as part of the moral explanation for 
why she acts in the way she does. If two people are burning in a fire and 
one is my family member; the reason why I saved my family member is 
merely informed by the fact that she is my family member. 
Thus, the reason why I pursue personhood as the moral goal is mostly 
because it is good for me to be perfect or to lead a fuller human life. The 
reasons involved are essentially about me as an agent and not so much 
the community important as it might be, in some sense. Metz reveals 
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clearly the agent-centred nature of this idea of person, in his criticism of 
it as a self-realization account. He submits: “If I ask why I should help 
others, for example, this theory says that the basic justificatory reason to 
do so … is that it will help me by making me more of a mensch or a better 
person” (Metz, 2007: 332). In situations involving, for example altruism, 
Metz notes that this account would not give a plausible explanation for 
why I helped that beggar at the corner. Metz holds the view that part of 
the explanation for helping poor people must involve less-or-no refer-
ence to me as the focus, but it must be riveted on the beneficiary, the 
patient. But, Metz notes that it is in the very make-up of this ethical term 
that the reasons that flow from it have to be intransigently agent-centred. 
I am not interested in evaluating this critique, I think however it rightly 
identifies the individualistic facet of this moral theory as demonstrated 
by its partialism that focuses on the self as the proper focus of morality.  
Thus, if it is true that the idea of personhood is central in African 
moral thought then it follows that it offers an individualistic under-
standing of African ethics. To say it is individualistic, it is to point to the 
fact that it locates ultimate value, not in the community or some relation-
ship, but in some feature intrinsic to an individual. Above, I argued that 
the ethical term of personhood characteristic of Afro-communitarianism 
is essentially individualistic. This individualism, I noted, manifests itself 
in both the goals set by this ethical term and by the reasons it offers for 
moral actions. The proper goal of morality is for an agent to realize her 
own true self – this goal of morality points back to the self as the proper 
focus of morality. In terms of reasons for acting, we noted that they are 
also rooted on the agent prioritizing herself. She acts the way she does 
largely because it is good for her. Thus, we can conclude that this ethical 
term is overtly individualistic.  
It may be objected that people like Menkiti thought of this term in 
communitarian terms. For example, Menkiti (1984: 172), who is credited 
with being the first to adumbrate this normative notion of a person in an 
African tradition, notes that it is a processual notion that requires that 
one be incorporated “into this or that community” and without this kind 
of community incorporation one would be considered a “mere dangler” 
(Wiredu, 2004: 17). And, again, in the same passage, Menkiti notes that 
in “this long process of attainment (of personhood), the community 
plays a vital role as a catalyst and the prescriber of norms”. 
The ineffectual nature of such an objection should be immediately ap-
preciated. No one denies the importance of the community as a catalyst 
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and as a prescriber of norms for evaluating whether one is leading a 
genuine or a true human life. I agree with Menkiti understanding of the 
role of the community. And, admitting this kind of the role played by the 
community does not amount to denying individualism. Ultimately, it is 
the individual effort that makes all moral the difference to whether one 
leads a good life or not. If that job of achieving personhood was largely 
attributable to the community then we would struggle with holding indi-
viduals accountable and responsible; it would even be difficult to judge 
some human beings as good or bad. So, it is the individual by exerting 
her moral energies to perfect her character that does all the relevant 
moral job and the community serves only as a moral incubator. The 
community, as alluded to before, is merely instrumentally good. The 
instrumentality of the community is noted by Menkiti when he talks of it 
as a „catalyst‟, which refers to a chemical substance that assists the 
chemical process by speeding it, for example, without being the focus of 
the chemical process or even its goal. As the prescriber of norms, the 
community sets cultural or normative standards; but it is individuals who 
live by those stands and who are equally judged by the same, some 
meeting them and some not. Below, I consider the idea of dignity to 
further buttress the point that African ethics is individualistic.  
 
DIGNITY AND INDIVIDUALISM  
 
The ideas of dignity and human rights have a currency in global moral 
political discourse (Donnelly, 1982a; 2009). This idea of dignity also 
holds an established place in African moral political thought (Donnelly, 
1982b; Gyekye, 1992; Deng, 2005; Ramose, 2009). „Dignity‟ is a moral 
doctrine that attaches intrinsic worth to human nature per se. In other 
words, the mere fact of being human marks one out as a bearer of spe-
cial moral features and thus deserving utmost respect (Donnelly, 2009; 
Toscano, 2011). One has dignity merely because they are human, it is not 
earned (George and Lee, 2008). This idea is important in moral discourse 
because it secures the equality of all human beings (Dworkin, 1977). 
It is important also because of its deontic restrictions i.e. it serves as a 
normative constraint over what means we may not use when seeking 
promote the good (Toscano, 2011). In other words, certain ways of 
promoting the good are wrong because they fail to regard the high 
respect due to a human being merely because she is a human being. This 
means, all things being equal, I may not kill another human being for the 
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sake of improving the lives of other human beings. A human qua human 
ought to be respected irrespective of what great global moral goals one 
may have in mind. 
To limit the potential danger inherent in the fascination or even 
fixation with the collective good as is common in African thought, 
Gyekye invokes this idea of dignity (1992: 114). In this light, Gyekye 
notes: “the reason is that the natural membership of the individual 
person in the community cannot rob him of his dignity or worth, a 
fundamental and inalienable attribute he possesses as a person”. Here, it 
is clear that Gyekye understands dignity like the rest of other thinkers as 
a fundamental or inalienable property of human nature. For Gyekye, 
dignity is so fundamental that it is one of the central considerations 
when setting up or even evaluating a moral political project. He erects 
his theory of communitarianism precisely to challenge radical com-
munitarianism that he thinks undermines this fundamental property that 
marks out a human being as a being of inherent worth. Gyekye is not 
alone in this project of taking dignity seriously.  
Another influential thinker of African moral thought in South Africa, 
Mogobe Ramose, invokes this idea of dignity. Ramose reminds us that 
dignity captures the “importance of the individual human being”. In 
another place, he notes: “The first is that the individual human being is 
an object of intrinsic value” (Ramose, 2009: 420). To signify the cen-
trality of this idea below the Sahara, Ramose appeals to this Sotho 
aphorism: ”feta kgomo o tshware motho”. And, he proceeds to comment 
on it in thus:  
 
”This means that if and when faced with a decisive choice between wealth and the 
preservation of the life of another human being, then the choice should be to 
preserve another life.” (Ramose, 2009: 420) 
 
This choice is informed by the fact that a human being is a bearer of 
dignity. He concludes by noting the importance and decisive nature of 
the status of human beings as bearers of dignity.  
These are by no means the only scholars who consider this idea of 
dignity to be central in African thought. In fact, there is a general 
consensus in African axiological system that a human being is a being of 
high value. Scholars might differ in their conceptions of dignity, but I am 
not aware of a salient scepticism of this concept in an African tradition. 
If this idea of dignity is truly an important facet of Afro-communitarian 
moral thought then it follows that this is another individualistic feature 
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that is part of the architecture of African moral thought. So, here we see 
that prominent moral terms in Afro-communitarian thought are es-
sentially individualistic.  
Two possible objections that may be raised against my defence of 
individualism. One argument might straight away jettison the claim that 
these two or even one of them is central to African thought. I doubt that 
many African scholars will find this to be a worthwhile move in Afro-
communitarian thought since one will be denuding African axiological 
considerations of some of its essential furniture7. The second strategy is 
to propose a plausible relationship theory as a counterexample to my 
argument. It is this kind of objection that I turn.  
 
OBJECTION: METZ‟S RELATIONALISM 
 
The objection that can be derived from Metz‟s moral theory is that my 
argument that individualism is a plausible feature of Afro-communita-
rianism is not true since he defends what he considers to be a plausible 
relational theory (2007: 321), so much that he thinks this relational  
theory should be taken as seriously as other influential global moral theo-
ries from the West like utilitarianism (2014). It is worth noting that the 
global influential moral theories that Metz thinks his relational theory 
should be taken as seriously as much as they are taken, are individualistic. 
In an important way, Metz seeks to defend the dominant view that 
African moral theories are communitarian (relationship-based) and 
Western ones are typically individualistic. 
I do not think this kind of objection really works against my argument 
that defends individualism as a feature of communitarian moral theories. 
I do not deny that Metz defends a novel relationalist interpretation of 
African moral theory. I deny however that his relationalism is plausible. 
This is by no means to suggest that we may not gain worthwhile moral 
insights about African moral thinking and morality in general from his 
moral theory. I personally have learnt a lot from Metz‟s moral theoriza-
tion in the African tradition and the tradition of African philosophy has 
greatly benefitted from his work. I however remain unconvinced about 
its plausibility. Elsewhere, I have argued extensively that the monistic 
relational theory of Metz has features that render it implausible (Molefe, 
2017c). I here reject the theory not on the basis of its incoherence, but I 
simply urge Metz to make up his moral-theoretical mind about whether 
he is committed to relationalism or individualism.  
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I say so because when Metz defends a theory of right action, he insists 
on defining it entirely in terms of some interpersonal relationship. But 
when he defends a conception of dignity, he invokes individualism. So, a 
close reading of Metz‟s moral corpus has this fundamental tension of 
defending both relationalism and individualism at the same time. Metz is 
aware of this disjuncture between these two disparate interpretations of 
African ethics in his moral philosophy. With regards to a relational 
account, Metz avers:  
 
”U: An act is right just insofar as it is a way of living harmoniously or prizing 
communal relationships, ones in which people identify with each other and exhibit 
solidarity with one another …” (Metz, 2010: 84) 
 
And, with regards to an individualistic account, Metz opines: 
  
”U2: An act is wrong … because it degrades the individual‟s dignity that she has in 
virtue of her capacity to engage in harmonious relationships…” (Metz, 2010: 94)   
 
It is crucial for the reader to note these two disparate ways to account 
for a theory of right action. The relationalist account (U) defines a right 
action in terms of respecting some interpersonal relationship of friend-
ship, but the individualist one (U2) in terms of respecting a person‟s 
capacity for relationships. One grounds morality on some external con-
sideration and the other on some internal one.  
After noting this disjuncture in these two possible ways to account for 
morality, Metz proceeds to make the comment that holds my defense 
together:  
 
”I am as yet unsure of how U2 and U precisely relate to one another, specifically, of 
whether they are ultimately equivalent, whether U2 is more fundamental than U, or 
whether they need to be combined in some way.” (Metz, 2010: 94) 
 
So, this is evidence enough that Metz is yet unsure about whether U2 
(theory of dignity) is more fundamental than (U) (a relational theory of 
right action). I here submit that until Metz makes up his mind about 
which theory is more fundamental, the relational or individualistic  
account, appeal to his relational account to object to my defence of 
individualism in African ethics remains moot. 
Even more, I wish to highlight that Metz‟s indecision with regards to 
relationalism and individualism is not a simple philosophical problem to 
solve. The problem lies precisely in my second argument for why indivi-
dualism is a crucial feature of all morality including Afro-communita-
rianism: the idea of dignity. There is no way to go around a theory of 
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dignity and its essential individualism. It is either Metz‟s moral theoriza-
tion will forever be characterised by this indecision with regards to either 
relationalism or he will prefer individualism. If he is truly committed to 
the idea of dignity as his writings suggest then it seems then he may have 
to jettison relationalism, a route that appears highly unlikely (Metz, 2010, 
2011, 2012). So, as things stand, we are stuck with this indecision; thus 
securing my position that this objection is not sufficient to unsettle my 




In this article, I sought to defend an ambitious argument that African 
moralities are more individualistic than African scholars have being 
willing to admit. To secure this radical claim, I invoked prima facie evi-
dence by considering salient ethical writings from both secularist and 
religious theorist in the African tradition. I proceeded to provide what I 
consider to be more concrete evidence from the two central ethical con-
cepts in the African tradition: personhood and dignity. I argued that 
these ethical notions are essentially individualistic. I concluded the article 
by considering a major objection that can be made against my argument 
that defends relationalism in African ethics. I demonstrated that this 
argument is far from convincing because of Metz‟s indecision between 




1 In this article, I use the word „African‟ in the way it is usually used by moral 
philosophers in an African tradition (See, Metz, 2007; Gyekye, 2010). For example, 
Gyekye (2010) opines: “Thus, in this entry, the term „African ethics‟ is used to refer 
both to the moral beliefs and presuppositions of the sub-Saharan African people 
and the philosophical clarification and interpretation of those beliefs and 
presuppositions” 
2 Here, I am not studying African cultures anthropologically to determine what they 
actually believed in terms of morality, that would largely be an empirical or a social 
science endeavor. This is a moral philosophical project that weighs on the literature 
on African ethical thinking to defend its interpretation of African moral culture by 
relying strictly on argument.  
3 I do so for an obvious reason. Much of the Western moral literature takes indivi-
dualism as their frame of moral theorization (see, Metz, 2014). Though there are 
deviations to individualism, they are not salient. 
4 Surely relationships figure in this moral process, but not as basic moral considera-
tions for accounting for right and wrong.  
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5 This understanding of communitarianism is not under scrutiny and is banally true. 
Metz‟s (2014: 315): “First, they cannot be sensibly construed as defining elements of 
communitarianism since they are sociological banalities that no one would reasona-
bly reject. Much too often in the literature, communitarians believe they are target-
ing liberalism and other „individualist‟ philosophies by noting that individuals cannot 
exist or flourish on their own. However, I am simply not aware of any influential 
Western, liberal or individualist thinker who has claimed that it is possible for, say, a 
baby to grow up into a normal adult without socialisation, or an adult to make sub-
stantial achievements as a Robinson Crusoe on a deserted island without a cultural 
tradition, emotional support, substantial resources, peer recognition and so on. Who 
has made, or would make, such patently false empirical claims?” 
6 I omit yet another weak objection that this account is Western rather than African 
since it defends individualism. I relegate this objection to a footnote because I think 
it begs the question. I am here arguing that all morality is individualistic but specifi-
cally focusing on African ethics. A stronger objection, one that is non-question-beg-
ging, would have to provide independent evidence to demonstrate that African 
ethics is not. A task I consider daunting for the detractor. 
7 I am comfortable with the move that conceives of dignity as a universal term 
rather than African. It supports my argument that all morality is individualistic. 
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